By T.V. Paul

January 28, 2026

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s call in Davos for joint activism by middle powers to resist U.S. President Donald Trump’s aggressive neo-imperial policies deserves global support, especially from the states most affected by them.

Carney’s call is a textbook case of “soft balancing”, whereby a visionary middle-power leader initiates policies aimed at institutionally and normatively restraining a threatening great power that has taken a disruptive path, bruising the rules-based international order.

The intent of the call is to raise the reputational and normative costs of aggressive policies, thereby affecting the administration’s cost–benefit calculations and influencing American public opinion.

Unlike traditional hard balancing, which relies on matching military buildup (internal balancing) and formal military alliances (external balancing), soft balancing employs strategies such as institutional binding, informal alliances, and economic statecraft to deny legitimacy to the actions of the threatening power.

Making aggressive policies illegitimate and costly—including by raising reputational costs—is a central objective. The eventual success of soft balancing depends on how the elite and public of the threatening power react to the delegitimization strategy of others. In this case, the rationale for proposing such a low-level balancing strategy is that the threatening power is simply too strong: if it resorts to military aggrandizement, an effective coalition is difficult to form given the vast power differential.

Moreover, the United States remains a major provider of collective goods, especially through trade and investment, and coercively forcing it to resume this role is not feasible. In the absence of an effective hard-balancing coalition, a lower-level, non-coercive, non-kinetic balancing effort is preferable to doing nothing.

The hope is that decision-makers in the powerful threatening state will eventually recognize the futility of their course of action and refrain from aggrandizement. This approach is also grounded in the idea that a state’s durability as a great power rests not only on raw coercive power, but also on the authority and respect it commands within the international system.

Weaker powers, if they unite, can diminish the legitimacy of great-power actions, although this does not always occur. The United States, however, is a plausible case for success. Soft balancing by allies and adversaries during and after the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2003 under the George W. Bush administration produced tangible results in the American electoral system.

Republicans lost to Democrats, and President Barack Obama—who campaigned on withdrawing from Iraq—won both the presidency and majorities in Congress in 2008. Obama convincingly argued that the Iraq invasion was based on a “tragically misguided view” and that “it should never have been waged.” For him, the illegal invasion and occupation of Iraq undermined U.S. power and legitimacy. His victory testified to widespread public opposition to the war.

As I argue in my book, Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era, soft balancing has been practiced by both great powers and non-great powers for over 200 years through institutions such as the Concert of Europe, the League of Nations, the Non-Aligned Movement, and the UN system, with mixed results.

Since the end of the Cold War and the onset of intensified globalization, the number of informal global institutions and the use of soft-balancing strategies have increased. Soft balancing against Russian aggression in Ukraine beginning in 2014 included expelling Russia from the G8, imposing economic sanctions on Russian elites, businesses, and companies, and freezing assets. In this case, NATO has also relied since then on hard balancing by providing military support to Ukraine and to Eastern European states that joined the alliance.

Soft balancing employs strategies such as institutional binding, informal alliances, and economic statecraft to deny legitimacy to the actions of the threatening power.

Soft balancing against China’s aggressive actions in the South China Sea has included efforts through the QUAD grouping and forums such as ASEAN. Countries such as India regularly practice soft balancing through membership in various groupings, including BRICS. Canada practiced soft balancing when it refused to participate in the Iraq War and joined European powers such as Germany and France in questioning the legitimacy of American actions.

This policy of the Chrétien government—followed by all successor prime ministers despite pressure from the U.S. and the UK—spared Canada an embarrassing outcome and prevented it from becoming a party to an illegitimate invasion. Canada opposed the war because it lacked UN authorization and because evidence of Iraq’s pursuit of nuclear weapons was unconvincing.

Similarly, the current situation calls for soft balancing. Prime Minister Carney is correct to contend that middle powers should not stand idly by but should unite to normatively challenge U.S. aggressive policies, even if they face some retribution. If states do nothing in response to the aggressive behaviour of a wayward great power, that power’s appetite for further aggression will only grow, emboldened by perceptions of weakness.

U.S. abandonment of the liberal order may be normalized for some time, but it remains possible that American public opinion—especially in key battleground states—will turn against the Trump strategy. A strong soft-balancing coalition led by U.S. allies would pose a significant moral challenge to aggressive behaviour. A large segment of the American public remains sensitive to reputational costs, despite current inaction.

Economic statecraft, especially the threat of reciprocal sanctions and denial, is also a potent tool for restraining the United States. If more countries ignore U.S. tariffs and pursue bilateral and multilateral trade agreements, the U.S. economy would ultimately suffer. This is already occurring as Western countries hedge and rush to form economic partnerships with China, India, and other emerging economies. Canada’s trade diversification is part of this strategy.

The U.S. dollar could also weaken if more countries reduce their holdings of U.S. debt instruments such as Treasury bonds, potentially fueling inflation and turning public opinion against the administration. While there will be short-term pain from Trump-style tariff retaliation and personal attacks, inaction would allow aggressive behavior to continue unchecked.

Coordination with European allies, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, South Korea, and rising powers such as Mexico, India, and Brazil is crucial for Canada to make headway with this strategy. Indeed, the European Union is already engaging in soft balancing by challenging U.S. aggressive actions toward Denmark and Greenland, offering firm support within the EU and NATO, and even threatening potential alliance consequences.

Some reports suggest that Denmark began divesting pension fund investments from U.S. Treasury bonds, while EU countries threatened similar actions if aggression toward Greenland occurred. EU states collectively hold approximately $3.6 trillion in U.S. Treasury debt. They also blocked a trade agreement previously signed with the Trump administration. Such opposition reportedly contributed to the withdrawal of Trump’s explicit plans to occupy Greenland.

Trump’s threat to annex Canada as the 51st state constitutes a fundamental violation of norms of sovereignty and territorial integrity, made all the more disheartening because it targets a close ally of more than 80 years. Hard balancing is difficult in this case, as the threat comes from a NATO ally. If the threat escalates, Europeans should come to Canada’s defense, as they have done for Denmark and Greenland.

For now, however, soft balancing remains a viable strategy despite possible short-term repercussions. It is likely to generate negative domestic reactions for Trump and may ultimately constrain his behaviour, especially if more countries join this effort. Doing nothing would only encourage further bullying.

The possible outcome of concerted action by middle powers and European allies is the defeat of Trumpism and MAGA in future U.S. congressional and presidential elections and the restoration of restraint in American foreign policy. Making America in its current geopolitical role a restrained hegemon is essential for world order, Canada’s continued existence as an independent state, and broader international security in the years ahead.

T.V. Paul is Distinguished James McGill Professor in the Department of Political Science at McGill University and a Distinguished Fellow at the Asia-Pacific Foundation of Canada. He has published extensively on balancing and soft balancing, including Restraining Great Powers: Soft Balancing from Empires to the Global Era (Yale University Press, 2019). His most recent book is The Unfinished Quest: India’s Search for Major Power Status from Nehru to Modi (Oxford University Press, 2024).