By Paul Meyer

February 10, 2026

On February 5th, the last legally binding constraint on the strategic nuclear forces of the United States and the Russian Federation expired.

Five decades of bilateral nuclear arms control agreements came to an inglorious end as the New Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty (New START) terminated and a void of uncertainty opened up with respect to the strategic nuclear arsenals of the two leading nuclear powers (which account for 90% of the approximately 12,000 nuclear weapons extant).

This vacuum is undermining strategic stability globally and calling into question the non-nuclear weapon status of several states, including Canada, to an extent unheard-of since we ratified the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) in January, 1969.

Indeed, the perception that the “nuclear umbrella” America has held over its allies contains large holes is giving rise to several states reconsidering the nuclear option, with doubts over reliance on America’s extended deterrence in countries such as South Korea, Japan, Poland, Sweden and Canada bubbling up and threatening to boil over.

Putting aside the fact that Canada has a legal obligation as an NPT state party not to acquire nuclear weapons, any attempt to do so would be courting disaster.

Given that our aluminum exports are considered a national security threat to the United States, one can only imagine the reaction of the Trump administration to the revelation that Canada was engaged in a covert nuclear-weapon development program.

This is hardly the way to safeguard our sovereignty and prevent foreign intervention. A more realistic approach and more in keeping with our traditional diplomacy is to work with like-minded middle powers to shore up the NPT and oppose a resumption of a wasteful and dangerous nuclear arms race.

To be clear, the New START agreement has been in serious decline since presidents Joe Biden and Vladimir Putin agreed in 2021 to the one-time, five-year extension provided for in the treaty.

The core limits specified by the treaty – 1550 deployed strategic warheads and 700 deployed delivery systems (ballistic missiles and heavy bombers) were validated through a comprehensive verification system. This included notification of test flights, data exchanges and up to 18 on-site inspections a year.

The treaty provided for a Bilateral Consultative Commission, where any concerns with implementation could be discussed. In early 2023 President Putin “suspended” Russian implementation of the treaty, citing hostile American positions on its military operations in Ukraine.

The United States followed suit shortly after and the cooperative verification measures were abandoned. Putin suggested last September that both sides informally agree to abide by the treaty limits for a year, but the United States never responded officially to this overture.

President Trump showed no interest in prolonging the treaty and subsequent to its expiry has stated that he wants to see a “new and improved” agreement negotiated, although the strategic dialogue necessary to do this has not been reinstated.

Putting aside the fact that Canada has a legal obligation as an NPT state party not to acquire nuclear weapons, any attempt to do so would be courting disaster.

We may not witness an immediate upsurge in deployed warheads although this eventuality will be more difficult to detect. Both Russia and the United States have thousands of warheads in reserve and could rapidly “upload” these warheads to the existing missiles which have excess capacity (e.g. a Minuteman ICBM normally has only a single warhead but has a capacity for 3).

Each side employs so-called National Technical Means (NTMs – spy satellites) but they cannot peer into a missile’s housing to count warheads, so both the degree of transparency and the stability that comes with this predictability under the treaty have been lost.

Strategic stability has also been rocked by the rapid but opaque build-up of China’s nuclear arsenals. Although it espouses a policy of “minimum deterrence” and a “no first use” policy, China has increased the size of its nuclear missile arsenal over the last few years from 300 to 600 with a projected total of 1,000 warheads by 2030.

This has introduced a tricky “three body problem” into the previously relatively stable bipolar relationship.

The first Trump administration had tried unsuccessfully to persuade China to commit to arms control discussions. Now, Secretary of State Marco Rubio has reiterated that for a future arms control negotiation to be worthwhile, it would need to involve China.

Beijing, however, continues to rebuff this notion, asserting that until Russia and the United States have reduced their forces down to China’s levels there was no basis for its participation in talks.

The requirement to deter simultaneously both Russia and China has already prompted calls in the States to increase the size of America’s offensive arsenal. As in the past, one can readily imagine partisan-fuelled claims that a “missile gap” has opened up between the United States and its adversaries, further spurring on the nuclear arms race.

To add to the current instability, the collapse under Trump 2.0 of America’s credibility in terms of its willingness to defend its allies is sparking new strains on the nuclear non-proliferation regime enshrined in the NPT.

This spring, the NPT will be holding its 11th review conference under the shadow of the failure of the two prior conferences (in 2015 and 2022) to agree on any outcome document. A “three strikes and you’re out” result risks discrediting the entire NPT regime.

The NPT’s underlying bargain of nuclear weapon states committing to nuclear disarmament in return for non-nuclear weapon states forswearing nuclear weapons is looking increasingly threadbare.

Once the sluice gates of proliferation are opened the risks of nuclear war deliberate or accidental will loom large. Our world may end, to paraphrase the poet, not with a whimper but a bang.

Paul Meyer is an Adjunct Professor of International Studies at Simon Fraser University and a Director of the Canadian Pugwash Group. A former career diplomat, Meyer served as Canada’s Ambassador and Permanent Representative to the UN and the Conference on Disarmament in Geneva (2003-2007).