By Augusto Lopez-Claros

March 11, 2026

In a recent Policy piece, Brussels-based trade lawyer Mark Camilleri offers a thoughtful and carefully argued critique of my own recent article on the possibility — admittedly remote in the short term — of Canada joining the European Union.

Mr. Camilleri raises concerns about the practical implications for Canada’s trade relationship with the United States. He is right to emphasize economic realities and institutional constraints.

But I respectfully propose that the debate requires a longer strategic lens.

The core issue is not whether Canada could or should begin accession negotiations tomorrow. Nor is it whether such a process would be politically arduous and technically complex. It would be both. The real question is what long-term institutional alignment best secures Canada’s prosperity, sovereignty, and influence in a rapidly changing global order.

Diversification is prudence, not provocation

Canada sends roughly three-quarters of its merchandise exports to the United States. That degree of concentration creates structural vulnerability. Even when relations are cooperative, heavy dependence on a single market leaves a country exposed to domestic political shifts beyond its control.

Strategic diversification is not an act of hostility; it is an act of prudence. Businesses diversify supply chains for the same reason investors diversify portfolios: resilience. Strengthening economic and political ties with Europe need not be interpreted as weakening ties with the United States. The world is not zero-sum.

Indeed, Canada has already embraced this logic through its Comprehensive Economic and Trade Agreement (CETA) with Europe, through participation in European defence frameworks, and through closer regulatory cooperation. The question is whether that trajectory should remain incremental and transactional — or whether it should evolve toward deeper institutional anchoring.

Geography matters, institutions matter more

The argument that geography still matters and that Canada is deeply embedded in the North American economy is undoubtedly true. But geography is no longer the primary determinant of prosperity. Growth in the 21st century depends increasingly on institutional quality: rule of law, regulatory coherence, human capital, predictable governance, and technological integration.

The European Union’s great innovation was not territorial expansion; it was institutional pooling. Jean Monnet understood that sovereignty can be strengthened, not weakened, when exercised through common rules. The EU created a space of free movement, regulatory harmonization, and shared governance among states that had previously been locked in destructive rivalry.

Canada already shares those institutional characteristics. On measures of judicial independence, corruption control, macroeconomic management, and democratic governance, it ranks alongside the EU’s strongest members. In many respects, Canada already behaves as a member of a values-based institutional club.

The rule-taker problem

What is often missing from the debate is the distinction between being a rule-maker and a rule-taker.

Global economic governance is increasingly shaped by large regulatory blocs. The United States and China set standards that ripple outward. The European Union, through its “Brussels effect,” exerts global influence in areas ranging from digital regulation to environmental standards.

If Canada remains institutionally detached from these rule-making centres, it will inevitably adjust to rules made elsewhere. Maintaining formal “independence” does not necessarily preserve sovereignty if the substance of regulation is imported by necessity.

The long-term strategic question is therefore not whether Canada can preserve CUSMA — it almost certainly can. The deeper question is whether Canada wishes to shape global regulatory norms or simply adapt to them.

A vision, not an immediate imperative

Full EU membership would indeed entail adopting the acquis communautaire and the common external tariff. It is also correct that Article 49 limits membership to European states and that treaty amendment would be required.

None of this renders the idea conceptually incoherent. EU treaties have been amended repeatedly. Political difficulty is not the same as legal impossibility.

But more importantly, the discussion is less about near-term accession mechanics than about strategic orientation. The 20th century was about rebuilding Europe after catastrophe. The 21st may increasingly be about consolidating institutional alliances among democracies committed to rule-based governance.

If geography becomes less decisive in a digitized and interdependent world, institutional convergence may become more important. Canada fits that profile exceptionally well.

Measuring the moment

A recurring concern is that closer alignment with Europe would undermine North American integration. This presumes that trade and political relationships operate in zero-sum fashion. They do not.

Canada can maintain robust economic integration with the United States while deepening ties with Europe. Many countries maintain overlapping institutional commitments — NATO membership overlapping with EU membership, for example.

The relevant benchmark is not whether Canada would abandon North America. It would not. The benchmark is whether Canada should hedge against uncertainty in a world where the architecture of multilateralism is under strain.

Middle powers and strategic diversification

In a world defined more by institutional coherence than geography, middle powers must act strategically rather than passively.

Canada has historically punched above its weight by embedding itself in institutions — from Bretton Woods to NATO, the Commonwealth and la Francophonie. The European Union is arguably the most sophisticated experiment in institutional sovereignty-sharing ever attempted.

Closer anchoring within that framework would not dilute Canada’s identity; it would amplify its influence.

A conversation worth having

To be clear: I am not proposing that Ottawa submit an application to Brussels next year. Nor am I dismissing the tangible benefits of CETA or the potential of a “CETA Plus” agenda. Those are important and should be pursued vigorously.

But strategic questions deserve long horizons. Brexit was once “unthinkable.” The euro was once “unrealistic.” Major institutional shifts begin as conversations that challenge inherited assumptions.

The choice before Canada is not between North America and Europe. It is between passive adaptation and proactive positioning.

If the world is moving toward regulatory blocs shaped by shared values and institutional depth, Canada must decide where it wishes to sit at the table.

In that sense, the debate is not fanciful. This is about long-term sovereignty, resilience, and influence. And those are precisely the kinds of questions middle powers cannot afford to postpone.

Augusto Lopez-Claros is the Executive Director of the Global Governance Forum, a Swiss-based nonprofit foundation. He has written extensively on issues of international cooperation. His latest book, Global Governance and International Cooperation: Managing Global Catastrophic Risks in the 21^st Century, co-edited with Princeton´s Richard Falk, was published by Routledge in 2024.