By Vina Nadjibulla

March 15, 2026

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s recent tour of India, Australia, and Japan was more than a series of diplomatic engagements. It was the first real test of the foreign-policy vision Carney outlined in his global-milestone Davos speech: that in a more fragmented and uncertain world, middle powers like Canada must diversify partnerships, strengthen economic resilience, and work more closely with like-minded countries.

The choice of destinations—-India, Australia, and Japan—was deliberate. Each is a major Indo-Pacific power, a critical democratic partner, and an increasingly influential actor in shaping the region’s political and economic order. Each is also confronting the same strategic dilemma Canada faces: how to preserve strong and constructive ties with the United States while building greater economic resilience and strategic agency in a more volatile global environment and amid growing uncertainty about U.S. policy.

Taken together, the three visits highlight an important nuance in Carney’s emerging foreign policy. Conversations in India, Australia, and Japan made clear that Canada’s Indo-Pacific partners are not embracing a narrative of rupture with the United States.

For most countries in the region, the goal is not to replace the United States but to hedge against uncertainty while maintaining a strong American presence in the Indo-Pacific. This is particularly true for Japan and Australia, whose security strategies remain firmly anchored in their alliances with Washington. Both governments see sustained U.S. engagement as essential to maintaining the regional balance of power, particularly in the face of China’s growing military and economic influence.

In that context, deeper cooperation with Canada—and with other capable middle powers—is seen not as an alternative to the United States but as a way of reinforcing a broader network of partnerships that can support regional stability.

The same logic ultimately applies to Canada. Geography, economics, and security realities make a fundamental rupture with the United States neither feasible nor desirable. The United States will remain Canada’s most important ally and trading partner for the foreseeable future. At the same time, that dependence leaves Canada highly exposed to shifts in U.S. trade policy and domestic political dynamics.

Diversifying partnerships—particularly in the Indo-Pacific—is therefore both an economic necessity and a strategic hedge. It is an effort to build greater resilience and policy flexibility, not a project aimed at replacing the United States.

Seen through that lens, Carney’s Indo-Pacific diplomacy is best understood as an effort to strengthen Canada’s strategic autonomy and another example of middle powers working more closely together while still operating within a U.S.-anchored security framework.

Carney’s tour produced tangible outcomes: progress on trade negotiations, new partnerships in energy and critical minerals, expanded defence and security cooperation, and agreements on emerging technologies and investment flows.

Yet each stop also served a slightly different strategic purpose.

India: A pragmatic reset

India was the most politically significant stop and received the most mixed coverage at home. Relations between Ottawa and New Delhi had deteriorated sharply after the diplomatic crisis of 2023. Carney’s visit marked a deliberate effort to turn the page on that chapter in the relationship and rebuild a partnership that both countries increasingly recognize as strategically important.

In a speech in Mumbai, Carney framed his visit as “The end of a challenging period in the relationship and the beginning of a new, more ambitious partnership between two confident and complementary countries.” He described Canada and India as “natural partners” and emphasized that repairing the relationship required sustained engagement across both a security track and an economic track. In that speech, Carney also drew a notable distinction between Canada’s approach to India and its more cautious recalibration with China. He noted that Canada sees cooperation with India extending into defence, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and emerging industries—areas that are not part of Canada’s current dialogue with Beijing.

The visit culminated in the adoption of a Leaders’ Joint Statement outlining a roadmap for renewed cooperation across trade, energy, defence, technology, and people-to-people ties. Taken together, these commitments articulate the most ambitious vision for Canada–India relations in recent years, laying out a broad and aspirational framework for elevating the partnership to a more strategic level.

The two governments also formally launched negotiations toward a Comprehensive Economic Partnership Agreement (CEPA), setting an ambitious target of concluding a trade deal by the end of 2026—ideally in time for the December G20 Summit in Miami. In parallel, the two sides agreed to pursue additional agreements covering critical minerals cooperation, digital trade, and investment facilitation.

Energy cooperation featured prominently during the visit. Canada and India committed to expanding collaboration across renewable energy technologies, nuclear energy, and critical minerals development—areas where Canada’s resource base aligns closely with India’s rapidly growing energy and industrial demand.

Commercial engagement accompanied the diplomatic announcements. Canadian and Indian companies unveiled billions of dollars in commercial agreements spanning a uranium deal, energy infrastructure, mining, and technology sectors. Canadian universities also signed thirteen memoranda of understanding with Indian partners, expanding research collaboration and student mobility as part of a broader talent and innovation partnership.

The economic logic of the relationship is compelling. India is one of the world’s fastest-growing major economies and a future powerhouse of energy demand, manufacturing capacity, and digital innovation. For Canada, it represents both a vast market and a strategic partner in sectors such as clean energy, artificial intelligence, agriculture, and education.

This reset also carries broader strategic significance for Canada’s Indo-Pacific strategy. India is increasingly central to the emerging economic geography of the region—positioning itself as both a manufacturing hub and a major destination for energy and infrastructure investment. For Canada, deeper engagement with India helps anchor its diversification strategy across several key sectors simultaneously: energy exports, critical minerals supply chains, digital technologies, and education partnerships. If managed carefully, this partnership could become one of the central economic pillars of Canada’s Indo-Pacific engagement.

Despite the breadth of outcomes announced during the visit, the reset remains fragile. Public opinion in Canada reflects lingering hesitation. A recent Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada-Angus Reid Institute survey found that while more than half of Canadians believe Carney’s trip to India came at the right time, attitudes toward India remain cautious following the tensions of recent years.

Rebuilding trust will therefore be essential if the relationship is to move forward. Security and law-enforcement dialogue between the two countries must demonstrate tangible progress if the broader economic, energy, defence, and educational partnerships are to develop. Without that foundation, the diplomatic momentum generated by the visit will be difficult to sustain.

Australia: Shining a spotlight on a trusted partnership

If India represented a reset, Australia represented consolidation. Canada and Australia already share deep institutional ties and remarkably similar political and economic structures. Often described as “strategic cousins,” the two countries share close alignment on democratic values, open-market economic systems, and support for a rules-based international order. Both are resource-rich middle powers with globally integrated economies and strong interests in shaping secure supply chains and resilient economic networks.

Yet despite these similarities, the relationship has often been somewhat overlooked—largely a function of geography and the fact that both countries have traditionally focused their diplomatic attention elsewhere. Carney’s visit helped place a well-deserved spotlight on this partnership and signalled Ottawa’s intention to elevate the relationship and develop deeper institutional ties with Canberra as part of its broader Indo-Pacific strategy.

The visit focused on expanding cooperation across several strategic sectors, including critical minerals supply chains, defence technology, artificial intelligence, and investment coordination. The two governments announced new initiatives aimed at strengthening economic security, defence and technological partnerships, and industrial resilience.

Critical minerals cooperation was particularly emphasized. Canada and Australia together hold a substantial share of global reserves of minerals essential to energy transition technologies and advanced manufacturing. Coordinating production, investment, and processing capacity could strengthen both countries’ positions in supply chains increasingly shaped by geopolitical competition and industrial policy.

Defence and security cooperation also featured prominently during the visit. Ottawa and Canberra committed to expanding joint military exercises, strengthening maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, and deepening collaboration in cybersecurity and defence innovation. These initiatives reflect the growing recognition in both capitals that middle powers must work more closely together to help maintain regional stability and support an open maritime order.

Carney’s address to Australia’s Parliament—the first such speech by a Canadian prime minister in nearly two decades—further underscored the strategic convergence between the two countries and the importance Ottawa attaches to the partnership now.

Looking ahead, the potential for Canada–Australia cooperation extends beyond bilateral initiatives. Both countries could benefit from working more closely across the Indo-Pacific, particularly in Southeast Asia. Expanded coordination through minilateral partnerships—whether in areas such as maritime security, infrastructure development, or critical minerals supply chains—could allow Canada and Australia to combine resources and expertise in ways that strengthen regional resilience and support emerging economic networks.

The Australia–Canada–India Technology and Innovation (ACITI) Partnership, focused on cooperation in artificial intelligence and digital technologies, could serve as a useful model for other interest-based minilateral partnerships among like-minded countries across the Indo-Pacific.

Japan: Anchoring Canada in the Indo-Pacific

The final stop of the tour—Japan—was brief but impactful. Carney became the first foreign leader hosted by Prime Minister Sanae Takaichi following her landmark election victory. The visit produced one of its most strategically significant outcomes: the elevation of Canada–Japan relations to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership.

Japan is arguably Canada’s most consequential partner in the Indo-Pacific. It is Canada’s second-largest Asian trading partner, a major source of foreign investment, and one of the most influential actors shaping the region’s economic and security architecture.

Economic security and supply chain resilience were central elements of the visit. Both governments agreed to deepen cooperation in critical minerals, clean energy technologies, semiconductors, AI, and advanced manufacturing supply chains. These initiatives build on Japan’s growing investments in Canada’s energy, mining, and infrastructure sectors and reflect Tokyo’s interest in securing stable and diversified supply chains for the industries that underpin its economy.

The automotive sector featured prominently in the discussions as well. Japanese automakers have long been among the largest investors in Canada’s manufacturing base, and both sides emphasized the importance of maintaining open and predictable trade conditions for the North American auto market. Japanese policymakers are watching closely as Canada and the United States approach the next review of the Canada–United States–Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). For Tokyo, continued access to a stable and integrated North American market remains an important priority.

Security cooperation was another key focus of the visit. Canada and Japan committed to strengthening maritime cooperation in the Indo-Pacific, expanding naval exercises, and deepening Coast Guard collaboration. These efforts reflect a shared interest in maintaining stability in the region’s sea lanes and strengthening maritime domain awareness.

While middle-power cooperation was a central theme of Carney’s Indo-Pacific tour, the strategic context shaping the Canada–Japan relationship inevitably includes both China and the United States. Japan remains deeply anchored in its alliance with Washington and sees sustained American engagement as essential to regional stability. At the same time, Tokyo is actively strengthening partnerships with other democratic middle powers as part of a broader effort to reinforce the regional order. In that environment, Canada is seen as a valuable partner.

For Ottawa, closer cooperation with Japan anchors Canada more firmly within the Indo-Pacific’s evolving strategic architecture. For Tokyo, Canada offers a trusted partner with significant energy resources, technological capabilities, and shared strategic interests. The elevation of the relationship to a Comprehensive Strategic Partnership reflects that convergence.

An Indo-Pacific moment Canada must seize

Prime Minister Carney’s Indo-Pacific tour reset a critical relationship with India, strengthened cooperation with trusted partners such as Japan and Australia, and—perhaps most significantly—raised Canada’s profile across a region that will play a decisive role in shaping the global economy and strategic landscape in the decades ahead.

Canada’s current visibility in this region presents a real opportunity—one that will require sustained effort to capitalize on. Ottawa will need to address several structural constraints that have historically limited Canada’s engagement with the region. Export infrastructure remains insufficient to support large-scale energy and resource flows to Asian markets. Regulatory processes continue to slow investment and project development. Within government, Asia expertise (especially on India) and institutional capacity remain uneven. And perhaps most importantly, Canada has struggled to sustain follow-through after moments of high-level political engagement.

The task ahead will be to ensure that this political momentum is matched by sustained institutional and whole-of-society engagement. Canada’s moment in Asia has arrived. The challenge now is to turn it into a lasting strategic presence rather than another fleeting diplomatic win.

Policy Contributing Writer Vina Nadjibulla is the Vice-President of Research & Strategy at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.