By Krenare Recaj

October 26, 2026

Aleksandar Vučić, the authoritarian populist defeated in Sunday’s stunning election upset served as either president or prime minister of Serbia for the past 12 years. But Vučić’s proximity to power and involvement in nationalist politics stretch back much further, to the regime of Slobodan Milošević, which he served as Minister of Information from 1998 to 2000.

Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party (SNS) was defeated by the Student List, the protest movement that campaigned against corruption and for government accountability and democratic reform. This movement emerged from mass anti-government protests that began in Serbia following the collapse of the Novi Sad railway station canopy in November 2024, which killed 16 people.

Immediate reporting has emphasized the historic nature of the election results, with outlets such as the Associated Press describing Vučić’s defeat as a seismic political shift. This optimism is reflected in the immediate reactions from world leaders as well.

EU enlargement commissioner Marta Kos posted a congratulatory message on X in which she wrote: “Dear Serbia, you have made your voice heard! After nearly two years of protests for democracy, the rule of law and the fight against corruption, Serbians turned out in historic numbers. Congratulations to the Student List on your victory! These are the very values at the heart of our European Union. A new chapter can begin for Serbia. The door to the EU is open, and we are ready to move forward together.”

The Canadian embassy in Serbia posted a congratulatory message welcoming a peaceful and democratic transition.

But observers familiar with the Balkans have also urged a more cautious optimism. Political scientist Jasmin Mujanović welcomed the results as an opportunity for regional stability but cautioned that “the (ultra)nationalist right will remain a major factor in the country’s politics,” while also warning that “we should not expect a 180-degree transformation in Belgrade’s positions on Kosovo, Bosnia, or Montenegro.”

Mujanović’s observations about the ideological diversity of the Student List points toward a broader and extremely important truth: Serbian nationalism and Serbia’s positions toward its neighbouring states are not exclusive to (ultra)nationalist right-wing parties such as Vučić’s Serbian Progressive Party. These positions can also be found among pro-democratic political movements, including elements of the victorious Student List.

This was already evident in the anti-government protests that began in November 2024 that led to the creation of the Student List party. Although these protests were primarily concerned with corruption and government accountability, the presence of Serbian nationalist symbols, including anti-EU, anti-NATO, and pro-Russian slogans, alongside explicit calls to “never give up Kosovo” was a consistent feature of the protests.

The international community must, from the outset, make clear that democratic reform at home does not excuse nationalist policies or provocation toward neighbouring states.

Western leaders have celebrated the protesters for standing up for democracy and European values, while largely ignoring the Serbian nationalists within the movement. This is particularly concerning now that the movement is moving from protesting against Vučić to governing Serbia.

Processing the election of any new government in Serbia without addressing, or reporting on, where that government stands on Kosovo and the other neighbours it once aimed to brutally dominate provides an incomplete picture. And the Student List has a record on these questions that advises caution.

In May, the student movement published a Memorandum on Kosovo which has been described as “steeped in nationalist epic imagery, referring to “sacred values” and “blood-soaked fields”, in which it declared that Kosovo was an “inalienable and integral part of the Republic of Serbia.”

Both Serbs and Kosovars recognize this language intimately. It is not dog whistle. These are the mantras of the same Serbian nationalism that turned Kosovo into a killing field in 1998-99 when Milosevic conducted his ethnic cleansing campaign across the Albanian province that finally gained its independence from Serbia in 2008.

And while some dismissed the Memorandum as necessary politicking to lure the “soft” nationalist vote from Vučić, Kosovars will be listening closely to how the government’s rhetoric and policies evolve once in office.

None of this is to suggest that the election results should not be welcomed, or that the Student List should not be given an opportunity to demonstrate that it represents a genuine departure from Vučić’s government. Serbia’s democratic future matters, not only for its own citizens but for the stability of the wider region.

But for years, the international community, including Canada, has been inconsistent in its response to Serbia’s nationalist government. Despite Vučić’s close ties to Putin’s Russia and his government’s repeated dangerous provocations in the region, Western governments have often been willing to overlook or tolerate its behaviour in the hope of maintaining regional stability.

This raises an uncomfortable question. If Western governments were willing to accommodate Serbian nationalism — whose most genocidal extremes of the 1990s still live in the memories of generations of survivors — under Vučić, how much more accommodating will they be toward a new government promising democracy, accountability, and reform?

The international community must, from the outset, make clear that democratic reform at home does not excuse nationalist policies or provocation toward neighbouring states.

Canada and its allies should welcome the opportunity to work with Serbia’s new government, but they must also be prepared to confront the policies they were too often willing to tolerate under Vučić.

Having failed to hold his government accountable, they cannot afford to repeat the same mistake simply because its successor is more appealing to Western audiences.

Krenare Recaj is a PhD Candidate at Carleton University and a Junior Fellow at the Bill Graham Centre for Contemporary International History, University of Toronto. Her research examines Canada and Kosovo, and the intersections between Canadian foreign policy, migration, and diaspora.