By Kevin Nealer and Jennifer Lee

October 27, 2026

In the closing days before the US midterm elections, several ground truths have emerged.

It’s About Trump Again: Donald Trump sought to make the election a referendum on his presidency. He’s gotten his wish. An inconclusive war of choice is dragging far beyond its expected conclusion, consumer confidence at a decade low, and record inflation hits pocketbooks across America while the nation’s capital is transformed by narcissistic building projects. Republican candidates for the entire House of Representatives, one third of Senate, and 36 governors/state house elections are tied to Trump policies as his approval tests new all-time lows.

Generic party preference is important, but the predictive value this time is limited: Along with presidential approval, among the most reliable predictors of midterm elections — especially when one party controls both houses and the executive — is generic voter preference for political parties. Democrats now have a significant advantage of 8-10% among likely voters — atypically large for them. But more granularity on that number is important. National partisan preference is far less meaningful than in individual states and districts that are in play. So too, it is important to get a sense of which voter populations have a preference. Our colleague analyst Charlie Cook cautions that “the national popular House vote isn’t particularly relevant, especially now, when the footprint of competitive House races is smaller than ever and hardly representative of the country as a whole.” Two high-quality polls show low single-digit Democratic preference in the most competitive races, so things are closer where it matters most to both parties.

“October surprises” are possible, but they are likely less important and Trump has almost run out of time: Trump has an impulse to control the news cycle and introduce surprise themes. Expect something like that before the vote. But voters have largely ignored his promises of payouts and sectoral rewards for a GOP win, inured to his penchant for unkept promises. While voters tend to “come home” to their parties in the two weeks just before an election, and new information seldom moves the needle. Oddly, Trump experienced none of the typical 5-10% approval bounce when he took the county to war in Iran (support for the war barely reached 40% in March and has since dropped to the low- to mid-thirties; never above 50%). A dramatic move in the closing hours — on Iran or otherwise — is unlikely to move the needle.

Does the Canadian tariff repositioning (temporary and involving a duty shift more than elimination) have predictive value for a revivified CUSMA?  It is a certain sign that GOP candidates in Maine and Michigan are at serious risk. Declaring victory and going home is a possibility for Trump, but so is post-election escalation if Republicans lose big.

The risk of Federal interference is real but likely limited to a few close races: Trump’s January 6th, 2021 Capitol assault is evidence he will not accept an election loss. That being the case, his threats and the statements and actions of senior Trump officials promising interference during and after the vote should be taken seriously. But the likelihood such interference will succeed is fairly low, given the pushback by state officials irrespective of party affiliation. Expect controversial federal actions, but recognize the only places that could be outcome determinative is in races that are very close. Trump administrations advocacy doubtless will call into question close adverse outcomes; the court record of such challenges gives evidence that they are likely to fail. What is likely is that such attacks on election integrity delay some results in close races and further diminish public confidence in elections.

What are the US policy consequences of a Democratic House and possible Senate majority?

• Democrats would be hobbled by the certainty of Trump vetoes on any major efforts to rescind such signature policies as the Trump tax cuts and reductions in the federal workforce; Congress cannot reinstate the Agency for International Development (AID) or Voice of America broadcasters.
• Any Senate majority would be both thin and brittle, limiting Democratic ability even to pass laws through both houses.
• The Senate has the sole responsibility to confirm presidential appointments, meaning few if any Trump cabinet or court replacements would be approved. (Since Trump is inured to using “acting” status, this may have limited effect other than on any Supreme or lower federal court appointments.)
• Seriatim investigations into Trump and Trump officials’ corruption and insider trading are certain to feature early and large in the agendas of both houses.
• Trump impeachment is a slim possibility, the two previous failures — one immediately following the attack on the Capitol — are proof of concept that GOP Senators will protect him.  More likely are impeachment actions aimed at Trump cabinet officials.
• Reassertion of Congressional authority over tariffs is a likely Democratic priority. The most immediate beneficiary is liable to be Canada since Trump tariff actions against our largest export market are solidly unpopular and likely to contribute meaningfully to GOP losses, in border states and beyond.

But Democrats’ urge to exercise oversight of Trump failures will be a secondary agenda. Most important will be an effort to show governance skills and take actions — whether or not ultimately vetoed — that are the reason for voter preference.

These will include 1) efforts to restore cuts to the Affordable Care Act and Medicaid, 2) a likely return to immigration reform, and 3) efforts to address affordability issues, and 4) War Powers Act moves to end the Iran war). Balancing the political instincts for retributive justice against the necessity of addressing voters’ concerns about inflation and benefit cuts will test the talents of Democratic leaders and may result in challenges to the current leadership in both houses — the only secret balloting on Capitol Hill and a source of drama over ideology and personalities.

Equally significant consequences could occur if Democrats out-perform in governor and state house elections. Poised to pick up a majority of governorships for the first time in years, if Democrats make similar gains in state houses Trump could experience challenges to his policies equal or greater than what the Senate and House could present. Control at the state levels also would strengthen Democrats’ hands going into 2028 general elections.

Policy Contributing Writer Kevin Nealer is a principal of The Scowcroft Group, a member of the Council on Foreign Relations and a former member of the President’s Intelligence Advisory Board.

Jennifer Lee is a Senior Associate at The Scowcroft Group, where she provides analysis to corporate clients and financial institutions covering East Asia, the Americas, tariffs, resources and the energy transition, as well as export controls.