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Philippe Lagassé

May 1, 2025

Canadian civil-military relations may be headed for a rough ride.

President Donald Trump is creating a rift among Canadian political leaders, the public, and the Canadian Armed Forces (CAF). At issue is whether the CAF should remain closely tied to the United States military and wedded to American capabilities, given Trump’s aggressive rhetoric toward Canada, his overtures toward Russia, and authoritarian slide at home, which includes denying people due process, defying the judiciary, and coercively threatening law firms and universities.

Whereas the CAF leadership sees President Trump as a temporary problem that must be managed, the Carney government and a sizable portion of the public believe that Canada must rethink its dependence on the United States. Notably, Prime Minister Mark Carney recently declared that Canada’s existing security relationship with the United States is “over,” and the Liberal electoral platform promised that Canada will increasingly look to other partners or domestic manufacturers for military capabilities.

At this stage, it’s not clear how the Carney government and CAF will reconcile their differing views on the future of Canada-United States defence relations. One possibility is that Carney will gradually be convinced that the security and defence relationship with the United States is too important to dilute on account of one administration, however abhorrent this president’s behaviour may be. The prime minister will not only hear this from the CAF, but from parts of the civilian bureaucracy, particularly from elements within the Department of National Defence (DND) and the intelligence community.

The other possibility is that the Carney government will hold firm, and perhaps become more convinced of the need to develop more strategic autonomy and new partnerships after engaging in talks with the Trump administration. If that happens, Canadian civil-military relations will grow more tense.

Orthodox principles of civilian control of the military tell us that the CAF will simply have to accept cabinet’s decisions and priorities. Military leaders may think that cabinet is shortsighted and will ultimately reverse course, but in the meantime, the CAF will need to faithfully implement the government’s direction. As the dean of civil-military relations, Peter Feaver, has argued, politicians have a right to be wrong about military matters.

Alternatively, the CAF and defence bureaucracy could slow-roll Cabinet’s priorities and rely on allies in the private sector, military associations, think tanks, and academia to publicly critique the government in ways that they can’t.  This approach would seek to frustrate cabinet’s efforts to reduce Canada’s military dependence on the United States until a new president is elected and their administration begins repairing the damage done by Trump. Suffice to say, this wouldn’t be great for Canadian civil-military relations, but it would be pretty standard bureaucratic behaviour when faced with unpalpable government direction. Turning back to Feaver, this would constitute ‘shirking’ on the military’s part, a regrettable but all-too-regular habit among armed forces.

We could see general officers being pushed out and publicly castigating the government as they exit. Considering what such developments would mean for the world, and how difficult the challenges facing Canada already are, let’s hope it doesn’t get to that.

President Trump, of course, will get a say. If his administration becomes still more aggressive toward Canada, further undermines the rule of law in the United States, or makes good on his claims to Greenland or the Panama Canal, the argument that the existing Canada-United States defence relationship must be preserved will become untenable. If the defence establishment continues to insist that ‘this too shall pass’ in those circumstances, we could end up with a civil-military crisis. If it gets really bad, we could see general officers being pushed out and publicly castigating the government as they exit. Considering what such developments would mean for the world, and how difficult the challenges facing Canada already are, let’s hope it doesn’t get to that.

At the moment, what we’re most likely to see is some version of the bureaucratic slow-rolling described above. Take the Prime Minister’s direction that DND and the CAF review Canada’s F-35 purchase. It won’t be hard for the defence department and armed forces to show how difficult and costly it will be to reconsider the F-35. The government may still insist that they move ahead with a review, but it could take long enough, and present such an expensive set of different options, that the whole question is allowed to quietly die. This would resemble Justin Trudeau’s 2015 pledge that Canada would never acquire the F-35. The Trudeau folk considered ways to make good on that promise, including the acquisition of a small batch of Super Hornets, but they eventually had to give way and let the F-35 compete in an open competition.

The slow-rolling may be less effective in other areas, though. Some in the CAF currently have their eye on an American airborne early warning (AEW) platform, the Boeing E-7 Wedgetail. As with Canada’s recent acquisition of Boeing’s P-8A maritime patrol aircraft, the technical and operational case for the E-7 is strong. The United States, United Kingdom, and Australia will be operating the E-7, which makes it the obvious choice from an interoperability (sharing sensitive information and operating picture) and interchangeability (common parts and supply chains) perspective.

The Liberal platform, however, stated that Canada would buy a domestic AEW platform. This almost certainly means a Bombardier plane, with a sensor suite from either Canadian or European companies. While there was no in-service Canadian platform that could compete with the P-8A, the Bombardier 6500 is already in use as an AEW platform. It would therefore be unwise for the CAF to dig their heels in over the E-7, given the government’s explicit commitment to buy domestic.

The main test of the civil-military relationship during this Parliament will be the development and implementation of a new defence strategy. If the Carney government is serious about buying more Canadian defence goods and building new industrial partnerships with allies in Europe and Asia, it will need to provide unambiguous policy direction to that effect. Otherwise, the status quo will prevail by default. This new strategy doesn’t need to be an elaborate document, such as a white paper, but it does have to give cabinet-level direction to DND and the CAF.

Since the Carney government is likely to link additional money for the military to these new policies, the CAF will have a strong incentive to positively contribute to this policy direction and implement it as soon as possible, however uncomfortable the military may be about what it proposes on the capability front. Should the development or implementation of this new defence strategy stall because of friction between the government and armed forces, it will be a troubling sign, especially if it prevents Canada from spending 2% of its Gross Domestic Product on defence by 2030.

Indeed, this is why we should pay close attention to the civil-military relationship over the life of this 45th Parliament. If it becomes dysfunctional or breaks altogether, Canada’s ability to better defend itself in an increasingly fraught world, next to a reckless United States, will be hampered.

Philippe Lagassé is associate professor and Barton Chair in international affairs at Carleton University.