By Vina Nadjibulla

October 31, 2025

Prime Minister Mark Carney’s first trip to the Indo-Pacific was deliberately ambitious. In just over a week, he spoke at the ASEAN Summit in Kuala Lumpur, joined APEC leaders in South Korea, made a bilateral stop in Singapore, held a rapid-fire series of pull-asides with key regional leaders, and held his first meeting as Prime Minister with Chinese President Xi Jinping.

The goal was clear: raise Canada’s profile, signal reliability, and put real numbers behind an economic diversification agenda that has long been more aspiration than plan.

Just before his departure, Carney set measurable targets: to double Canada’s non-U.S. trade within a decade and attract $500 billion in new investment into trade-enabling infrastructure, clean energy, and productivity-enhancing technologies. These are stretching but necessary goals. They tell Asian partners that Canada intends to show up and be useful. They also tell Canadians that diversification is no longer a slogan—it’s a strategy for protecting prosperity in an age of weaponized interdependence. And they signal to Washington that while Canada remains tightly integrated with the U.S. economy, it will exercise agency in shaping its own future.

Carney’s trip landed at the right moment. Across the region, governments are looking for partners that are predictable, rules-based, and not forcing them to choose between Washington and Beijing. Canada’s message—that it honours its commitments, pursues high-standard trade agreements, and supports inclusive and sustainable growth—resonated. The prime minister highlighted progress toward a Canada-ASEAN Free Trade Agreement, announced new bilateral negotiations with the Philippines and Thailand, and emphasized Canada’s comparative advantages in energy transition, food security, innovation, and education.

The Competition for Capital

Prime Minister Carney is not the only leader courting Asian investment. The United States, under President Trump, has demanded enormous pledges—over US$550 billion from Japan and US$350 billion from South Korea—tied to its “America First” re-industrialization push. Even Malaysia has investment obligations built into its new deal with Washington. Canada, in effect, is asking from the same pool of capital at a time when the U.S. offers the advantages of size and leverage.

Ottawa can argue persuasively that Canadian infrastructure and energy projects will strengthen continental competitiveness and supply-chain resilience. But uncertainty about the future of Canada–U.S. integration still gives investors pause. Canada will need not only sound projects but also a coherent national narrative explaining why Asia is essential to our long-term prosperity and resilience.

Security and Strategy: Showing Up Where It Counts

If economic diversification was the headline, security partnerships were the deeper story. Canada can no longer appear in the Indo-Pacific only as a commercial actor and expect to be taken seriously. The Canada-Korea Security and Defence Cooperation Partnership, announced by Prime Minister Carney and President Lee, is a milestone—the first accord of its kind for Canada in the Indo-Pacific. Defence Minister David McGuinty’s follow-on visit to Manila, on November 2, to conclude a Visiting Forces Agreement with the Philippines sends another strong signal. Both South Korea and the Philippines are on the front lines of coercion and want partners who bring capability as well as conviction.

These agreements are not symbolic. They tie directly to Canada’s own defence-industrial future. South Korea’s Hanwha Ocean is one of two finalists in Canada’s submarine procurement process, and Carney’s visit there underscored how defence cooperation can have industrial and technological substance. It also aligns with his government’s commitment to make generational investments in Canada’s defence—an acknowledgment that the old triad of assumptions underpinning our security (a stable U.S., reliable NATO, and protective oceans) no longer holds.

Canada’s comparative advantage lies in niche capabilities—maritime domain awareness, cyber-forensics, dark-vessel detection, and training in explosive-ordnance disposal—that complement allied assets. These are the kinds of contributions regional partners remember and rely on.

Energy and Economic Security

Energy was another pillar of the trip. For now, that means LNG and oil; in the near future, clean energy and nuclear, including Small Modular Reactors. Several ASEAN members are seeking exactly that mix. Canada’s message—that it can be a reliable supplier of secure, low-carbon energy—resonates with partners eager to diversify away from single-source dependence. The opportunity is dual: to help them meet development goals while creating new markets for Canadian technology, finance, and expertise. But success will depend on speed, scale, and coordination—areas where Canada’s machinery still lags its ambition. Asian partners move quickly; if Canada wants to compete, it must match that tempo with clearer priorities and faster execution.

The Carney–Xi Meeting: A ‘Turning Point’

Inevitably, the meeting between Carney and Xi Jinping drew outsized attention. Lasting just 40 minutes, it produced no major breakthroughs, but Carney accepted Xi’s invitation to visit Beijing—Canada’s first such leader-level opening in eight years. Some observers immediately framed this as a “reset,” even a revival of the so-called strategic partnership. That is, at best, an incomplete picture. To use Carney’s term, it may be more of a turning point.

Yes, there are areas where limited cooperation may be mutually beneficial. But the relationship with China remains complex, economically competitive, and strategically challenging. Nothing in publicly available intelligence or law-enforcement reporting suggests that the Chinese Communist Party’s behaviour has changed over the past seven months when it comes to foreign interference, cyber intrusions, or threats to Canadian interests in Ukraine, the South China Sea, Taiwan, or the Arctic.

Dialogue with China—including at the most senior level—is important. But Canada must be realistic about what it hopes to achieve and clear-eyed about the risks of deeper economic integration or strategic dependence on Beijing, especially at a moment when Beijing’s leadership feels emboldened by its discussions with Washington.

This turning point, initiated by Prime Minister Carney, has to be pursued with caution, in close consultation with allies in Europe and the Indo-Pacific, and sequenced carefully to avoid unintended consequences for Canada’s ongoing negotiations with the United States. A renewed channel with Beijing can be useful for managing disputes—on canola, energy, and consular services—but it cannot substitute for vigilance.

The Long Game

So, was the trip a success? Yes—for three reasons. First, it sharpened Canada’s message: we are a reliable, rules-based partner that honours commitments and seeks shared prosperity.

Second, it added real substance on defence and security, answering a longstanding request from regional partners. Third, it raised Asia’s profile at home, reminding Canadians that economic security and resilience depends on a broader set of relationships.

But the trip was also a reminder that this is a long game. It will take years to diversify trade relationships, attract Asian investment into Canadian infrastructure, and build operational defence partnerships. Carney’s visit was a strong start—one that must now be followed by sustained engagement, business missions, and public-diplomacy efforts that keep Asia at the centre of Canada’s global outlook.

For decades, Canada’s prosperity rested on three pillars: continental integration with the United States, collective defence through NATO, and the comforting illusion that geography could shield us from global instability. All three are under strain. Diversifying toward Asia is not just about markets—it’s about autonomy, resilience, and agency in a world where economic and security risks are intertwined.

Carney’s trip showed that Canada is ready to think and act at scale. The challenge now is to sustain that momentum—turning presence into power and ensuring that, this time, engagement with Asia is not episodic, but enduring.

Vina Nadjibulla is the Vice-President of Research & Strategy at the Asia Pacific Foundation of Canada.