CUSMA and the New Canadian Statecraft

April 27, 2026
This year on Canada Day, we will celebrate our 159thanniversary as a nation, a confederation determined that U.S. ‘manifest destiny’ will not extend into ‘Canada’s fair domain’.
This year, July 1st is also the deadline for review of the Canada-US-Mexico Agreement (CUSMA). Once more, we’ll be focused on our uncertain relationship with the United States. The status of CUSMA, which regulates more than $U.S. 1.8 trillion in trilateral trade, is about more than just market access. It is a test of national purpose.
Ottawa’s current approach — continuing negotiations while pursuing trade diversification and strengthening resilience at home — is the right one. It reflects a clear-eyed recognition that the relationship is not collapsing, but it is changing. Discipline, unity, and perseverance must be Canada’s guiding principles.
Canada’s chief negotiator, Janice Charette, sensibly put the deadline into perspective, describing it as “a checkpoint, not a cliff.” The agreement does not expire; it evolves, likely into a system of annual reviews. That may sound technical. It is not.
The worst-case scenario is formal U.S. withdrawal. That remains unlikely. As Donald Trump’s popularity drops, domestic constraints are returning: industry pressure, market reaction, and congressional limits. In what form CUSMA will emerge is the question: a stable framework, or a rolling negotiation shaped by tariffs, politics, and power? A slow erosion of the agreement may prove more damaging than a clean break.
Markets will react before governments do. Investment decisions in autos, energy, and manufacturing, depend on predictability. Annual review risks replacing certainty with permanent doubt. The deeper problem is not procedural. It is structural.
The longstanding assumption that the United States would anchor a stable, rules-based trading system has been shredded by Trump’s weaponization of trade. Prime Minister Mark Carney has put it plainly: “The U.S. has changed, and we must respond.”
Washington has shifted toward sector-by-sector bargaining and tariff leverage. Canada remains committed to rules-based integration. That is the real rupture. Not dairy. Not digital taxes. But whether trade is governed by rules at all.
U.S. Trade Representative Jamieson Greer captured the divide succinctly describing “Two models that don’t fit together very well”: Canada “doubling down on globalization” while the U.S. seeks to “correct” it.
For the Trump team, tariffs are no longer temporary tools. They are policy. As Greer has said, “tariffs are here to stay… we will never go back to a zero-tariff world.” Carney’s response has been equally firm. Canada will “not let the U.S. dictate terms.” Nor will it pay any “entry fee” to begin negotiations.
Carney has also warned that the U.S. has “fundamentally changed its approach to trade, raising tariffs to levels last seen during the Great Depression.”
This is not a passing phase. It is a new operating environment. Canada’s task is not to ‘win’ the negotiation. It is to manage a relationship undergoing structural change. That requires discipline: not reacting to artificial deadlines; not conceding simply to secure talks and, above all, maintaining unity at home.
Washington has shifted toward sector-by-sector bargaining and tariff leverage. Canada remains committed to rules-based integration. That is the real rupture. Not dairy. Not digital taxes. But whether trade is governed by rules at all.
Federal-provincial coordination is no longer optional. It is a strategic necessity. Premiers are engaged as never before. They are also exposed. Provincial actions, from liquor policies to procurement rules, have become bargaining chips in Washington.
That is why Mark Carney’s revamped sectoral and pan-partisan advisory committee matters. Bringing together political leaders, business, labour, and policy voices helps reinforce a single national position. It signals seriousness. It reduces the risk of fragmentation.
But coordination must go beyond optics. It requires constant consultation, disciplined messaging, and a shared understanding of priorities. Canada cannot negotiate effectively abroad if it is divided at home. CUSMA is only part of the broader challenge in how Canada positions itself in a more transactional, less predictable American system.
Start with economics. Trade is no longer just about efficiency. It is about leverage. Washington is reshaping supply chains through tariffs, subsidies, and industrial policy, often at the expense of allies.
For Canada, this exposes a structural vulnerability. Roughly three-quarters of exports still flow south. Geography is not a policy choice. It is a constraint. The answer is not naïve diversification, there is no replacing the United States, but strategic diversification.
Canada must deepen ties with Europe and the Indo-Pacific while embedding itself more intelligently in U.S. supply chains. That means aligning in critical sectors: energy, critical minerals, advanced manufacturing, without surrendering autonomy or risking a new version of overexposure.
Investment follows the same logic. The era of passive openness is over. Strategic sectors must be protected. Others should be aggressively opened. Capital will be increasingly conditional.
On climate and energy, the opportunity is alignment. U.S. policy, including subsidies, is driven as much by competition as cooperation. Canada must position itself as an indispensable partner, particularly in clean energy and critical minerals, while guarding against being outcompeted.
Defence is where geography bites hardest. Canada operates under the American security umbrella through NORAD and NATO. But credibility now matters more than ever. Carney’s push to meet NATO spending targets is not symbolic. It is strategic. At the same time, Canada should deepen partnerships with Europe and Indo-Pacific allies. Not as substitutes but as complements.
This is the logic of ‘variable geometry’: flexible coalitions in a fragmented world. Proximity to the United States was once Canada’s greatest advantage. It is now, in Carney’s words, a vulnerability: “Many of our former strengths…have become weaknesses, weaknesses that we must correct.”
This is not anti-Americanism. It is realism. The Canada-U.S. relationship is not ending. But the comfort of assumption, that shared values guarantee shared outcomes, is gone.
CUSMA will likely survive July. The question is whether it remains a foundation or becomes a forum for constant renegotiation. Canada cannot control Washington’s strategy. But it can control its own. And that, now, is the test of Canadian statecraft.
Policy Contributing Writer Colin Robertson, a former career diplomat, is a fellow and host of the Global Exchange podcast with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Ottawa.
