How the Shenzhen Photo-Op Exposed Trump’s Untenable Position on Ukraine
By Maria Popova
November 21, 2026
The the Xi Jinping-Donald Trump-Vladimir Putin trilateral in Shenzhen — a propaganda effort to intimidate the world with a show of autocratic swagger among three nuclear powers, including the corruption-captured, erstwhile democratic superpower — at least provided clarity on one crucial question.
On the tactically intractable Russia-Ukraine war, Donald Trump has confirmed the conflict of interest that disqualifies the United States as ostensible peacemaker. That conflict lies in Trump’s disingenuous portrayal of the White House as a neutral party when it obviously isn’t.
The latest, most absurd evidence of this was Trump’s deliberately effusive greeting of Putin as his “friend” in Shenzhen — a trolling moment he doubled down on via his Truth Social account today after Ukraine President Volodymyr Zelensky responded by calling Putin a “killer”.
Trump had been presenting the US as an honest broker based on its postwar history in peace negotiations when, in fact, he has long put a very large thumb on the scale in favour of Russia, including by, per the Canadian cliché, icing the puck to delay a resolution and give Putin time to change the narrative.
To the extent that there was any doubt about that before Shenzhen, it has been dispelled by Trump’s brazen embrace of a geopolitical order defined by its contempt for democracy, including Ukraine’s democracy, and his literal embrace of Putin.
Perhaps to distract or divert from its massive loss in the midterm elections, the Trump administration has recently engaged in a flurry of diplomatic activity on the Russia-Ukraine war.
The Witkoff-Kushner duo has continued its shuttle diplomacy, bilateral Russia-Ukraine talks took place in Abu Dhabi, yet, no “big, beautiful agreement”, to use Trump’s words, is taking shape.
There are many reasons for this failure — from the amateurism of the Trump administration envoys to the fact that Russia’s invasion is stalled and neither Russia nor Ukraine faces a collapsing war effort.
But the main reason is that Russia is not actually negotiating an end to the war. Instead, Russia is attempting to upend the entire European security order, over the heads of Europe and in concert with the Trump administration. After nearly five years of staggering losses, now estimated at over 450,000 dead, Russia maintains maximalist goals. It demands control over Ukraine and now control over more of Europe.
The leader of the Russian delegation to the Abu Dhabi talks, Vladimir Medinsky, a historian rather than a diplomat, openly laid out Russia’s expansionist desires about Europe in starkly overt terms. Medinsky’s recent statements that “Wherever the Russian flag has been raised, it must not be lowered” and “As our leader so vividly put it, wherever the foot of our Russian soldier has stepped, that is ours,” fit better in a doctrine of conquest than in negotiations and peace talks.
Which gives the Trump White House not one but two conflicts of interest in representing itself as a broker rather than a Putin helper in this dynamic: its obvious aversion to democracy and the hypertactical playbook it clearly shares with the Kremlin. Both Trump and Putin seem convinced that might should win, whether it’s right or not.
Medinsky also talked about a new security architecture for Europe that would be like a modern Yalta or Potsdam, which is an open admission that Russia wants to return to dominating half of Europe, like the USSR did after 1945.
These positions expressed by a Russian official have two aims: to borrow legitimacy from historical precedent, no matter how dubious or unsavoury, and to rhetorically reveal Russia’s desire to dominate Europe. Russia has long tried to present itself as a defensive actor, but a country that is afraid for its own security does not ask to be given control of half a continent.
No amount of sophistry can twist the basic fact that since 1991, no one started a war against Russia, but Russia has invaded its unprotected neighbours one by one; a series of assaults that have done nothing to enhance either Russia’s geopolitical credibility or standing in the international community.
Today, Russia lacks the military capacity to repeat the Soviet march through Europe in 1945. The Yalta and Potsdam agreements were forced on Eastern Europe when Soviet troops were already on the ground. For now, Ukraine has stopped Russia’s expansion in Donbas. Russia demands control beyond its means, from withdrawal by the Ukrainian Armed Forces from Ukrainian territory to withdrawal by NATO from the Eastern flank countries.
As Andrei Kozyrev — who served as first foreign minister of the Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin — recently put it: ‘Discussing Ukraine’s security guarantees, Europe’s security architecture, or Ukraine’s borders with Putin is like asking a rat to approve the design of a rat trap’.
Despite this evidence of Russian expansionism, the Trump administration insists that Russia has legitimate fears. On the way to Abu Dhabi, Jared Kushner claimed that the European security architecture needs to be reworked to “address the security concerns of all sides.” Even for an administration that has replaced conventional diplomacy with gaslighting, this was a triumph of projection over reality.
What could Russia possibly be afraid of right now? It has no predatory counterpart in its neighbourhood.
No European country has ever expressed demands on the internationally recognized territory of the Russian Federation. No European country or the US has tried to dictate who Russia can form alliances with, what laws it can adopt domestically, who can govern Russia and how they should be selected. These are all demands that Russia has made on its neighbours and continues to insist on.
The only demands made on Russia are to comply with international law and respect the territorial integrity and sovereignty of its neighbours, which it has recognized in international treaties. Ukraine wants Russia to withdraw from all Ukrainian territories it currently occupies in Crimea and parts of Donbas, Zaporizhzhia, and Kherson. Moldova and Georgia also would like to see Russia give back their internationally recognized territories, which Russia has held for decades.
The Kremlin might be fearful that, ultimately, it would have to return all stolen lands. This fear might loom larger every day as Ukraine’s Armed Forces achieve strategic and tactical successes by targeting Russia’s oil refineries deep inland and Russia’s illegally built infrastructure in the occupied territories.
The near-destruction of the Crimean bridge in Kerch, for example, is likely to seriously hamper Russian military logistics in Southern Ukraine, in addition to having delivered a serious symbolic blow to the Kremlin’s claim that “Crimea is ours”.
Putin might also be afraid that he would end up in The Hague in front of the ICC, which has charged him with war crimes. In Shenzhen, he seems to have hammered that point with Trump, who has parroted Putin’s concerns and is attacking the international body, calling it a “rogue globalist organization” that needs to be restrained.
Despite often dismissing sanctions as ineffective, the Russian dictator might be concerned that Russia’s economy would eventually collapse under the pressure. In Shenzhen, Putin tried to advocate against sanctions by calling them “a thing of the past” only to have Prime Minister Mark Carney remind him that Canada and its European allies would press on as long as he continues his illegal war.
Ultimately, Putin may well be fearful that Russia could be made to pay reparations to Ukraine for all the damages it has inflicted since 2014.
We should always describe these fears in accurate terms rather than succumb to Russia’s own gaslighting. The Russian government is afraid that its revisionist strategy might suffer a strategic defeat. Russia is afraid of being held accountable for its crimes of aggression.
These fears and concerns should not be allayed. They are not defensible on the part of a chronic violator of international law. They are not concerns about Russia’s security.
They are concerns about whether Russia is still a great world power that gets its “sphere of influence” and “backyard” of docile vassals. No matter how strongly both Putin and the Russian people are tied to these ambitions of great power status, they don’t deserve accommodation. Not until Russia can prove that it will no longer terrorize its neighbours. That’s how legitimate peace negotiations with failing aggressors work.
So, the only legitimate security issue on the European continent is how to stop Russia from launching invasions. The existing security architecture of NATO and the OSCE has unfortunately failed to contain Russia, but the answer is to try to correct the failure not to scrap the architecture and start making Russia’s expansionist ambitions a reality.
As Andrei Kozyrev — who served as first foreign minister of the Russian Federation under Boris Yeltsin and now lives in Miami — recently put it: “Discussing Ukraine’s security guarantees, Europe’s security architecture, or Ukraine’s borders with Putin is like asking a rat to approve the design of a rat trap.”
Europe has already repeatedly rebuffed Washington’s pressure for a new architecture. EU foreign policy chief Kaja Kallas has emphasized that Europe has a security architecture in place, which Russia keeps violating. European officials will not accept a deal involving Europe that the US has negotiated with Russia over their heads, any more than Ukraine will accept such a deal about Ukraine.
Whatever Washington floats, it cannot force Europe to pretend that Russia has legitimate fears that others must indulge. A new security order built on that fiction would reward the aggressor and continue showing Russia that threats and violence pay.
The task is to stop the aggressor and force him to abandon his goals. That means continuing to help Ukraine, strengthening deterrence and keeping the pressure on Moscow. Russia has no security concerns. It has ambitions of domination in Europe, and Europe knows it.
Policy Columnist Maria Popova is the Hiram Mills Associate Professor of Political Science at McGill University and Co-Director of the Jean Monnet Centre Montreal.
