This piece is published by Policy in cooperation with Carleton University’s Norman Paterson School of International Affairs as part of our Emerging Voices program, which provides an editorial platform for outstanding students.

Vika Bereza

June 9, 2022

Kevin Lynch, a former clerk of the Privy Council and secretary to the cabinet, once said about Canada’s position as 14th on the World Economic Forum’s Global Competitiveness Index: “Fourteen is a very Canadian number.” After a series of noteworthy achievements by Canada from 1945 to the early-2000s – wherein Canadian John Humphrey drafted the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948), Canada led the first United Nations peacekeeping mission (1956), Canada joined the G7 (1976), Canada led on the abolishment of apartheid (1991) and Canada led on the Land Mines Treaty (1997) – the past 20 years have been notably less impressive.

Canada’s United Nations standing is diminishing, as evidenced in our lost bids in 2010 and 2020 for a rotating seat on the UN Security Council. We were not invited to join the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP), the soon-to-be largest free trade area in the world, nor were we asked to join the United States, Australia, and the United Kingdom in AUKUS, a new defence pact aimed at containing the growing military might of China. Despite Canada’s commitment to advancing gender equality abroad, Canada only ranked 12th on the 2021-2022 Women, Peace and Security Index, a 7-point drop from our 2019 ranking.

On paper, our priorities are ambitious: Strengthen Canada’s engagement and presence in the United Nations; support the rules-based international system so that it can better confront those who are seeking to undermine democracy, human rights, and the rule of law; expand Canada’s engagement with allies to promote peace and security; and develop an Indo-Pacific Strategy. Yet, despite our ambition, Canada received a meagre grade of ‘C’ on the Canadian Foreign Policy Journal’s 2021 foreign policy review – the lowest on record. Driven largely by two “D+” grades in Diplomacy and Defence, the grade consisted of 30 percent for “rhetoric vs reality”, 60 percent for overall performance, and 10 percent for openness, transparency, and accountability. What is it that happens in the space between ambition and realization prevents us from translating our rhetoric to action?

The obvious answer is the COVID-19 pandemic, which hit Canada’s economy hard. Between March and April 2020 alone, Canada lost 3 million jobs though many new jobs have been created as the economy has recovered. Headline consumer inflation was up 5.1 percent in January 2022 – a 30-year high. Canada has the most confirmed COVID-19 vaccinations per capita, yet those who demand more vaccines are the same people who criticize the government for procuring too many.  They accuse Canada of contributing to “vaccine apartheid.” The mass purchase of vaccines by high-income countries leaves low-income countries with inadequate or delayed doses. Our neighbour to the South took the global health crisis as an opportunity to push for protectionist, America-first policies, including the Trump administration’s decision to prevent exports of face masks across the border, even though Canada and the United States have a free trade agreement.

Ongoing friction with China, our second-largest trading partner, persists: Meng Wanzhou’s extradition case; China’s unwillingness to accept Canadian trade clauses on gender, labour and environment; and the arbitrary detention of the “Two Michaels” led to the abandonment of free trade talks between the two countries. This comes when Canadian businesses are keen to expand their operations in China and call on Ottawa to communicate an explicit China strategy. Instead, caught between two global powers, Canada has, once again, settled for inaction.

The same cannot be said about Canada’s position on Russia. In recent months, Canada has been receiving praise for its principled and firm response to Russia’s invasion of Ukraine in February. In a surprising diversion from our usual, noncommittal and, at times, hypocritical foreign conflict response – such as our condemnation of human rights abuses in Saudi Arabia at the same time as we continue to sell light armoured vehicles (LAVs) to the country – Canada has been, from the outset, decisive and vocal in its criticisms of Russia’s actions in Ukraine, starting with Russia’s illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014.

However, when you compare our rhetoric to our actions, you will find that Canada is still overpromising and underperforming. Commitments to Ukraine look nice when delivered, but they come to the detriment of our own capabilities. Since the start of the war, Canada has sent approximately US$394 million in additional military aid to Ukraine, surpassing the United States’ $350 million and falling second only to the European Union’s $504 million. However, Minister of National Defence Anita Anand has warned that the Canadian military’s stock of surplus weapons available for donation is largely depleted. Meanwhile, the International Committee of the Red Cross is asking Canada not to mix promises of humanitarian aid with announcements about military support and sanctions. Doing so threatens the neutrality that aid groups require to operate safely.

However, when you compare our rhetoric to our actions, you will find that Canada is still overpromising and underperforming.

The sanctions that Canada unilaterally imposed under the Special Economic Measures Act after Russia’s annexation of Crimea have been expanded to include: sanctions against Russian President Vladimir Putin himself; the cancellation of all existing export permits to Russia; asset freezes on numerous additional Russian and Belarusian individuals and entities; bans on purchases and imports of petroleum; and the prohibition of Russian ships from docking or passing through Canadian waters. However, the Russian economy is largely insulated against foreign sanctions, and the value of Canada’s exports to Russia (circa 2020) is relatively small — 0.11 percent of our exports around the world.

The exodus of more than 14 million Ukrainians has precipitated a major humanitarian crisis. In response, Canada has announced special immigration measures, including the extension of visas for Ukrainians already in Canada for up to three years, the free issuance of work permits to visitors wishing to stay in Canada, and the establishment of an immigration hotline. When asked why Canada will not do away entirely with visa requirements for Ukrainians, Immigration Minister Simon Fraser cited unfeasible regulatory and technological changes both internally and externally.

Meanwhile, Canada’s promise to welcome an “unlimited number” of Ukrainians has been met with logistical bottlenecks. From March 17 to April 19, Immigration, Refugees and Citizenship Canada (IRCC) received over 163,747 applications from Ukrainian refugees. Of those, more than 100,000 are still outstanding. As of April 2022, about 14,000 Ukrainian nations have made it to Canada. Those who arrive under the new Canada-Ukraine Authorization for Emergency Travel (CUAET) program find that their temporary resident status means they won’t be eligible for the critical services typically offered to people fleeing conflict. While CUAET temporary residents will have access to language training, orientation, and employment assistance, they will be ineligible for more critical support, such as the Interim Federal Health Program (IFHP). Provincial goverments like Manitoba and Newfoundland and Labrador are stepping up to cover the costs of the mandatory CUAET medical exam, which can cost up to $350.

It would seem that Canada’s response to the conflict in Ukraine serves more to signal our virtues and appease our Ukrainian diaspora – the largest outside of Europe – than it does to bring about effective, streamlined, and well-fitting support.

Russia’s actions in Ukraine pose a threat to the rules-based international order, which has long been a central pillar of Canada’s foreign policy agenda. This became glaringly apparent after Russia and China vetoed a UNSC resolution demanding that Russia immediately stop its attack on Ukraine and withdraw all troops. The veto, while expected, highlights the near-powerlessness of the UN to respond to offences when the offender is one of the five permanent members of a Security Council divided between democracies and non-democracies at a time of heightened systemic rivalry.

Now, more than ever, Canada needs to shred its timidity and think outside the box. We must proactively secure our position in the new global order.

There are two avenues Canada can take to assert itself as a leader in the face of the current crisis and secure a role in the “new normal.”

First, we look to the south. We must consider the potential that closer relations with the United States can be a gateway to our membership in alliances elsewhere, such as the RCEP, AUKUS, and the Quadrilateral Security Dialogue (QUAD).

Although the QUAD – composed of the United States, Australia, India, and Japan – is not a formal alliance, the group has intensified its security and economic ties in the face of tensions with China. Given the uncertainty of China’s position vis-à-vis Russia, stronger alliances with the United States and other like-minded partners in Europe and Asia can help insulate Canada against the economic fallout of the war in Ukraine.

AUKUS is a trilateral security pact whose original mission was for the United States and the United Kingdom to help Australia to acquire nuclear-powered submarines. On April 5, the AUKUS pact was extended to include new trilateral cooperation on hypersonic weapons and counter-hypersonics, arguably to play catch-up with Russia after using hypersonic missiles in Ukraine.

Canada has the potential to be more than a middle power with limited influence. Our policy response to Russia’s war in Ukraine has the potential to redefine our place in the emerging world order.

Canada should not be left behind in the hypersonic arms race. NORAD commander General Glen VanHerck warned that hypersonic weapons challenge NORAD’s capacity to provide threat warning and attack assessments for Canada and the United States. The more sanctions Canada employs against Russia, the more we draw Russian attention to our borders. If we wish to keep voicing our principled stance against Russia and in support of Ukraine, it would be wise to bolster our defence alliances.

Canadian military analysts say Canada was not initially included in AUKUS mainly because we had nothing to contribute to a nuclear submarine program. In a public statement, AUKUS leaders expressed a desire to seek opportunities to engage allies on hypersonics, cyber capabilities, artificial intelligence, quantum technologies, and additional undersea capabilities. This could be an incentive to change Canada’s position, especially given the vulnerability of Canada to cyberattacks. Allowing this opportunity to pass us by risks diluting our relationships with our allies, weakening our ability to defend ourselves, and missing out on long-term industrial and security benefits.

The other policy option is to look to the East. Canada needs to take a more significant role in the Indo-Pacific’s development or risk getting locked out of the region’s economic, diplomatic and security benefits. Canada has already used existing mechanisms, such as military exercises among Indo-Pacific nations, to get involved in the region. In light of the security threat posed by Russia, Canada would be wise to act quickly in engaging with like-minded allies such as Japan, South Korea, India, Indonesia, and Australia, in an economic and security partnership. Japan is a party to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), and Australia, Japan, and South Korea are already parties to the RCEP.

Other areas for collaboration with like-minded countries in the region include bringing together middle powers to promote multilateralism and non-military solutions to Indo-Pacific challenges, with specific focus given to the threat of potential conflict between China and neighbouring countries. An expanded China-alternative agenda could also include forging coalitions against hostage diplomacy and economic coercion.

If Canada can strengthen its ties in the region, it would bode well for our adaptability, relevance, and economic security. In seeking opportunities to deepen relations, Canadian policymakers need to evaluate each regional ally on its merits rather than as an opportunistic means to build up a roster of partners which could be drawn upon when necessary to confront China or Russia. Otherwise, as with our Security Council seat bid, we risk bringing too little to the table, too late.

Canada has the potential to be more than a middle power with limited influence. Our policy response to Russia’s war in Ukraine has the potential to redefine our place in the emerging world order. No matter which direction we take, what we cannot afford to hew to the status quo. Suppose Canada fails to keep up with our allies in defending the liberal, rules-based international order, forging new economic and security alliances, developing new technologies, and aligning on cybersecurity issues? In that case, we risk becoming increasingly isolated from those who can help us most when we need it.

Vika Bereza is an M.A. International Affairs candidate at the Norman Paterson School of International Affairs (NPSIA), specializing in Diplomacy and Foreign Policy. Her research interests include women’s economic empowerment, international ethics, foreign affairs, and international relations theory.