OSW

By Fritz Lodge

December 9, 2025

It is difficult to make sense of what is now at least the third iteration of highly publicized but so-far fruitless efforts on the part of the Trump administration to negotiate peace in Ukraine.

At this writing, The Financial Times is reporting that Volodymyr Zelensky has again been pressured by the Trump administration to respond “within days” to a proposed peace deal requiring that Ukraine to accept territorial losses in exchange for unspecified U.S. security guarantees, with Donald Trump said to be hoping for a peace deal “by Christmas”.

The current round of talks began after Nov. 19, when reports emerged that U.S. Special Envoy Steve Witkoff and Russian sovereign wealth fund director and Kremlin advisor Kirill Dmitriev had negotiated a 28-point peace plan that appeared to draw heavily from Russian demands (indeed, some linguists believe it was actually translated directly from Russian).

That initial plan — patently unacceptable to Ukraine — has since been moderated in response to reported counter-proposals produced by European allies and in talks between the U.S. (Witkoff and Trump’s son-in-law Jared Kushner) and Ukraine, most recently last week in Miami. Witkoff and Kushner also met Russian President Vladimir Putin in Moscow last week for talks, but few details have been released. This week, Zelensky met with the so-called E3 European allies — France, Germany and the UK — in London to discuss the latest draft proposals; all made clear that Ukraine will not surrender territory as part of a deal. Ukraine is working on its own draft deal to present to the White House.

Where does all this leave peace talks? A breakthrough is always possible. But one persistent detail that has scuttled all previous attempts to end the war remains unresolved: Putin clearly has no desire to stop the war, even on terms that significantly favor Russia’s position. From the beginning of the war, the Russian president has doggedly stuck to maximalist demands on which he has shown no sign of compromise. These extend well beyond the issue of territory (reportedly the focus of US-Ukraine talks in Miami) to include the demilitarization of Ukraine, reassertion of Russian influence over its government, prevention of any NATO presence or other security guarantees, and more.

It is telling that when the 28-point peace plan was leaked, Russia did not publicly support it, though that may simply indicate that no document will be enough for Putin at this juncture, and that Moscow’s goal in negotiations is less to reach a deal than to drive a wedge between the US, Ukraine, and allies.

Of course, this stubbornness and Trump’s desire to end the war and normalize relations with Russia has fueled the fear that the US president might go over the heads of Ukraine and its allies in Europe and elsewhere to strike a one-sided deal with Moscow and force it on Kyiv. Indeed, the Trump administration has repeatedly seemed to pursue such a strategy, and Trump’s recent interview with Politico in which he criticized Zelensky and “weak” European leaders demonstrates that the U.S. pursuing a one-sided deal is a possibility. However, three factors consistently restrain this instinct:

There is no real evidence that Ukraine is losing the war. Ukraine faces many challenges, and Russian territorial gains have increased, but they remain marginal and come at great cost, with little sign of an imminent breakthrough. Similarly, while Zelensky’s government has been rocked by a corruption scandal in recent weeks, this may reduce his flexibility to negotiate rather than force him to accept a bad deal that would be widely unpopular. (Most Ukrainians support a negotiated end to the war but not at any cost; e.g., 71% oppose major territorial concessions). With European support, Ukraine has the ability to continue the fight even with a significant reduction in U.S. support, reducing Washington’s leverage.

1. Nevertheless, Trump and many around him remain convinced that Russia must win. But, as I wrote for Policy Magazine in September, this idea is probably more the result of a successful Russian effort to spread its own narrative of inevitable victory than facts on the ground.
2. As I wrote for Policy Magazine in November, Zelensky, European allies, and Ukraine’s supporters in Congress and the Trump administration have significantly improved their strategy for managing Trump in these periods. The coming weeks will show whether these lessons (namely to flatter the U.S. president and accept a version of his proposals while letting Putin demonstrate his unwillingness to deal) are utilized.
3. The worst-case scenario in which the U.S. abandons Ukraine and precipitously ends all support is not necessarily fatal, but it might weaken Ukraine enough to allow a Russian breakthrough. While Trump clearly wants a swift end to the war, a sudden collapse of Ukraine’s war effort would look like a failure and invite negative comparisons to Biden’s withdrawal from Afghanistan.

It is possible that this time is different and that some space for a deal can be found. But, if talks fail, what comes next? Watch US sanctions policy. Relatively lost in the press coverage of peace negotiations is the fact that, on Nov. 21, the Trump administration imposed some of the most significant sanctions on Russia since the start of the war. Although there have been some waivers (including the extension to April of Lukoil’s deadline to sell foreign assets after Treasury blocked a sale to “Kremlin puppet” Gunvor), the new measures against Russian oil majors Rosneft and Lukoil mean that upwards of 70% of Russian oil exportsnow face US sanctions.

If peace talks fail and Trump perceives Putin’s intransigence as the cause (always uncertain given their close relationship), there is a potential window for a further intensification of U.S. sanctions pressure on Russian oil exports just as the Russian economy and budget is showing signs of strain. With a global oil supply glut pushing prices down to $58 per barrel, Trump has – if he is willing to take it – an opportunity to significantly increase sanctions pressure on Russia without leading to a spike in gas prices at home.

Indeed, just the announcement of existing sanctions appears to be having an effect on Russian oil outputand revenues; to maintain this impact the U.S. will need to stringently enforce the sanctions by regularly targeting new entities who violate them. To go further, the Trump administration could follow through on threats to announce secondary sanctions that target foreign buyers of Russian oil; such measures on Russia’s largest buyer, China, could provoke retaliation but targeting Indian refiners (the second-largest purchasers), as well as discouraging Turkey and other smaller buyers, would still have an impact.

Setting aside whether Trump is likely to take such a path, it is important to stress that sanctions are not in and of themselves a strategy to end the war. What sanctions represent is a recognition of the fact that Putin must be forced – not just coaxed – into negotiating an end to the war on reasonable terms. Much more than economic pressure will likely be needed to achieve this. Putin must be faced with the reality that his goals cannot realistically be achieved on the battlefield before a sustained peace can be reached.

In order to do this, Ukraine will need the funds and arms to continue fighting. European support is critical, especially whether the EU can agree this month on at least a stopgap plan to finance Ukraine’s approaching fiscal cliff in early 2026 (possibly by leveraging frozen Russian assets). But that Rosneft and Lukoil have been targeted at all suggests that there is some constituency within the White House that wants at least to keep open the option of pressuring Russia to seriously engage in a path to peace. Compared to a relationship that appeared to be in tatters after the disastrous Trump-Zelensky Oval Office meeting in February this, at least, is progress.

Policy Contributing Writer Fritz Lodge is a principal at The Scowcroft Group, where he provides strategic risk advisory services on issues including the Russia-Ukraine War, the Middle East, and sanctions and export controls.