By The Scowcroft Group

April 3, 2026

President Trump’s first speech since launching his war on Iran – delivered a month after its start against the backdrop of rising public disapproval of both Trump and the war – could have been used to reassure America and the world of a military exit strategy and path to reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

He achieved neither, instead offering a muddled and often contradictory collection of threats, justifications, and objectives for the war, failing to reveal what he ultimately seeks to achieve in launching a military strike campaign that is sophisticated and impressive but not itself a war strategy.

What the speech did make clear is that the war will likely continue in the near term, with Trump saying “we’re going to hit them [Iran] extremely hard over the next two to three weeks” (his preferred pronouncement for events in which he is unsure of the timeline).

He has also renewed threats to destroy Iranian bridges and power plants (some already targeted) that, beyond extending potential violations of international and U.S. law, would almost certainly broaden Iran’s retaliation against energy and civilian infrastructure in the Gulf.

The war is already escalating quickly, with U.S./Israeli strikes on civilian infrastructure and Yemen’s Houthis entering the war with strikes on Israel — these could deepen the energy crisis by expanding to Red Sea shipping, where up to 7 million barrels of oil may be pumped to avoid Hormuz.

As shortages due to choked Hormuz deliveries of oil, gas, fertilizer, petrochemical, helium, and other commodities start to hit, even a few more weeks of closure could further spike energy prices and more widely damage the global economy. It is unclear at this writing how the reported downing of a US F-15 over Iran and unfolding search for its crew may affect US operations.

Is there a viable off-ramp to the conflict? One unknown is whether the U.S. and Israeli strikes can cripple Iran’s ability to retaliate, allowing operations to reopen the Strait. Defense Secretary Hegseth has claimed that Iranian attacks have fallen by “90%”, but they continue to launch persistent missile and drone strikes and some reports suggest only 50% of Iranian missile launch capacity has been destroyed.

And Iran need only succeed a handful of times to keep the Strait of Hormuz closed (or destroy other sensitive infrastructure) so the only sustainable off-ramp to the conflict is likely a negotiated settlement. However, while Trump may be ready for talks, Iran has repeatedly denied official negotiations are taking place and is likely very distrustful of re-entering negotiations with a president who has twice interrupted talks with bombing campaigns (the recent attempted assassination of a key negotiator only deepens this mistrust).

Beyond distrust, Iran also appears to believe that it is winning the war (both its foundational goals – to survive and inflict cost – have so far been met). This leverage has added new demands to its negotiating position, including a ceasefire, end to Israel’s operations in Lebanon, security guarantees, war reparations and sanctions relief, and effective sovereignty over Hormuz.

There is a yawning gap between this and the reported U.S. “15-point plan”, while Trump’s threats to send the country “back to the stone ages” (sic) – presumably a pressure tactic – are almost designed to set Iran’s emerging hardline leadership against giving any ground in negotiations.

In the larger strategic context, unless the U.S. decides to commit to invading Iran and destroying its government as the Bush 43 administration did in Iraq, the end of the war will likely require a political settlement, not a military victory.

Is a U.S. ground operation possible? Trump knows the domestic political cost of ground operations that could invite casualties and has tended to prefer strike campaigns and pinpoint Special Forces operations (e.g., capturing Venezuela’s former President Maduro).

That is probably still the case, but as the war continues to escalate and talks remain elusive, Trump may be tempted to use the U.S. Marine and Army airborne units converging on the region, with press speculation and Pentagon briefings focusing especially on the potential seizure of Kharg Island (Iran’s main export hub).

The apparent focus on Kharg is puzzling. It is far from the Strait of Hormuz and control of the oil export terminals probably would not create meaningful negotiating leverage over an Iranian regime that views this fight as existential (Iran also has some other export options). The fact that preliminary air strikes occurred against military facilities there lends some credence to the idea, but it’s also possible the focus on Kharg is a bluff or pressure tactic.

Other potential missions include a ground assault to force an opening of the Strait, possibly by taking strategic islands that control the Strait itself (e.g., disputed Tunb islands, Qeshm), ports from which mining operations could occur, and land-based missile drone launch sites.

The most logistically challenging objective would be any effort to seize Iran’s roughly 440kg of highly enriched uranium (HEU) – realistically, safely removing the HEU can probably only be done in the context of negotiations. Trump sowed further confusion about the weight of the uranium in the war’s calculations when he said he “doesn’t care about” Iran’s uranium stockpiles.

Whether the use of U.S. ground forces will measurably contribute to ending the war depends on: 1) their success, 2) whether the Iranian leadership coalesces, 3) whether the assets the U.S. forces seize are truly of value to that leadership, and 4) whether the loss of oil, fertilizers, and other key commodities through the Strait contribute to pressure which causes President Trump to modify his goals

In the larger strategic context, unless the U.S. decides to commit to invading Iran and destroying its government as the Bush 43 administration did in Iraq, the end of the war will likely require a political settlement, not a military victory. That must come from policymakers, not military leadership, who ultimately can only execute on the strategy given to them.

This will be difficult for an administration that tends to disdain process, policymaking, and diplomacy. It will also require Trump to decide what he wants to achieve in Iran, how fast he needs to achieve it (as the economic impact expands), and what he is willing to give up to end or deepen a war that now defines his presidency.

The greatest dilemma for this president is that, unlike most other crises Trump has faced or created, he does not have the unilateral ability to end this one. Both Iran (and Israel) get a vote and could well decide to continue the conflict if its end is not properly managed. Trump must choose whether to sacrifice pride for peace, or to double down.

The Scowcroft Group is a Washington, D.C.-based international business advisory firm founded by the late Brent Scowcroft, former National Security Advisor to Presidents George H.W. Bush and Gerald Ford. Its principals generously provide Policy’s regular Letter from Washington and Scowcroft Group Snapshot posts.