Managing the CUSMA Impasse Toward January’s Review

October 12, 2026
With public attention on this side of the border shifted to the October 19th Alberta referendum and in the U.S. to the November 3rd midterms, Canada should use the current pause in the CUSMA negotiations to strengthen its position.
Waiting for Donald Trump to discover good neighbourliness is no strategy. Ottawa should prepare for the impasse to last beyond November, perhaps into the new year, while remaining ready for an earlier opening.
American public opinion offers an opportunity, but no rescue. A CFR–Morning Consult survey, conducted in August and published October 6th, found that 56 per cent regard Canada as a fair-trading partner. Yet only 28 per cent want the next president to remove all tariffs on Canada.
Affordability supplies the stronger argument. Three-quarters of Americans worry about the cost of groceries; among those concerned, 83 per cent say tariffs increase prices. Canadian advocacy should connect tariff removal to American household budgets and jobs. The poll measures attitudes, however, not whether tariff concerns will decide votes. Sympathy for Canada should not be conflated with support for Ottawa’s negotiating position.
Republican Senate candidates in three border states are challenging Trump’s Canada tariffs. After Michigan’s October 8th debate, GOP Senate candidate Mike Rogers said his message to the administration was “time to wrap it up”. Maine’s Susan Collins has reiterated her opposition. New Hampshire GOP Senate candidate John Sununu has declared: “We shouldn’t be in a trade war with Canada.”
These are useful openings, but whether the dissent survives the election and changes White House policy is doubtful.
Former U.S. Trade Representative (USTR) Robert Zoellick supplies the strategic argument. In Foreign Affairs, he warns that Trump is destroying “a strong continental base from which Washington projects power”. Strong Canadian and Mexican partners enhance American security and prosperity. Coercing them weakens that advantage. This is an argument grounded in American interests that deserves a wider hearing amid Trump’s larger assault on the U.S.-influence status quo.
Trump, as we know, sees Canada differently — not just as compared with Washington’s foreign policy community but vis-à-vis previous presidents — and we need to recognize this.
In an Oval Office interview on September 28th, he again called us “one of the worst countries in the entire world” and imagined Canadians arriving to say, “Sir, we are sorry.” His rhetoric makes submission sound like the price of settlement.
Contacts continue. On October 8th, USTR Jamieson Greer said Washington was “holding fast”. The January 12th deadline for submissions to the 2027 CUSMA review provides a planning horizon, not a timetable for negotiations. It is unlikely that either electoral losses or American economic pain will compel Trump to compromise.
Our objective should be to preserve CUSMA’s benefits while securing reciprocal improvements. As Trump cannot be trusted, verifiable implementation and workable remedies are essential.
The pause is in negotiations, not commerce. CUSMA retains value, but executive tariffs and targeted import bans undermine its benefits. A tariff raises entry costs; a prohibition closes the market for covered products. Uncertainty can divert the next factory investment before existing trade disappears. Firms may keep filling orders while locating new production elsewhere. Waiting therefore carries costs that current export figures will not fully reveal.
Canada has domestic demand, resources and opportunities to raise productivity. National resilience, however, cannot compensate a community losing its principal employer. Nor does American self-harm assure restraint: tariffs can benefit protected producers while damaging their customers. Retaliation must be judged against both its bargaining value and Canadian costs.
Our objective should be to preserve CUSMA’s benefits while securing reciprocal improvements. As Trump cannot be trusted, verifiable implementation and workable remedies are essential.
The following five priorities may help:
First, keep channels open and prepare practical offers to remove prohibitions and reduce tariffs on integrated production. Judge concessions by Canadian outcomes. Permanent commitments require more than temporary presidential indulgence. Sequence concessions against observable American performance. Interim relief cannot supply the certainty needed for investments lasting decades.
Second, strengthen the domestic consensus in the wake of the Quebec election and the Alberta referendum. Ottawa and the provinces need agreed priorities and commitments they can deliver. Provincial measures cannot credibly become federal bargaining commitments without broad provincial agreement. Shore up support for affected workers. Provide viable firms with working capital. Provide business with clear customs guidance. Enforce binding investment undertakings, including those that Ottawa says Cleveland-Cliffs is breaching at Stelco. Assistance should preserve productive capacity, with conditions and measurable results.
Third, double down on our advocacy efforts to mobilize American interests in mutually beneficial commerce with explicit examples of the cost of tariffs to consumers. Customers, manufacturers, governors and legislators need to hear how Canadian inputs sustain competitiveness. American firms documenting lost sales, higher costs and forgone investment should be encouraged to make the case directly to Congress and through the CUSMA review.
Fourth, accelerate investment supporting diversification. Better ports, transport links, internal trade and project execution expand our choices. Diversification also requires firms willing to invest and serve customers. Measure success by additional customers and Canadian value-added, not a shrinking American share of diminished exports.
Fifth, consult Mexico closely. Trump is reportedly pressing for energy partnerships and purchases with Mexico similar to its commitments with South Korea. Any Mexican bargain could influence Washington’s demands of Canada on energy, Chinese content and rules of origin. Coordinate where interests coincide; recognizing that each country will pursue its own settlement.
Ottawa must also prepare Canadians for a defensible compromise: what it achieves, how concessions are reciprocated and which interests require protection. Public resolve strengthens negotiators but unrealistic expectations will constrain them.
We should return to bargaining when an opening sets the stage for a reciprocal, workable agreement that improves our capacity to choose. For now, we need to use the time to model contingencies, build alternatives and strengthen the home front.
Contributing Writer Colin Robertson, C.M., C.D, a former career diplomat, is a fellow and host of the Global Exchange podcast with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Ottawa.
