By Colin Robertson

October 30, 2026

Canada’s new national security plan recognises that sovereignty depends on our capacity to defend our territory, sustain our economy and make our own choices. Now comes the harder task: implementation.

Mark Carney’s Plan for a Stronger Canada declares: “Canadian sovereignty, first, and above all.” Fair enough. But sovereignty requires equipment, infrastructure, intelligence and institutions that work. Governments cannot announce their way to independence.

The plan brings economic security, foreign policy, defence, public safety and intelligence under one framework. Eight capabilities underpin it: technology, critical minerals, defence, energy, transportation, pharmaceuticals and biotechnology, food, and financial systems. The premise is sound: domestic strength gives diplomacy weight and makes coercion harder.

This is realism: begin with interests, understand the distribution of power, match ambition to means. Values matter. Their defence requires capabilities and judgment.

But lists do not establish priorities. Ministers must decide what Canada needs to control, what reliable partners can supply and what we cannot afford. Detailed policies in all five areas are still to come.

Paul Martin’s 2004 policy, Securing an Open Society, provides the instructive contrast. Martin addressed terrorism, pandemics, infrastructure failures and institutional coordination. His plan sought to protect Canadians, prevent threats against allies originating here, and contribute to international security. Its outlook rested on prosperity within “an increasingly interdependent world.”

Carney’s challenge is different: interdependence can become an instrument of pressure. The task has shifted from securing Canada within an open system to preserving Canadian choices when that system is contested.

Our allies’ national security plans offer useful comparisons.

The Trump administration’s 2025 strategy shares Canada’s emphasis on industry, energy and technology. But its pursuit of hemispheric pre-eminence through a “Trump Corollary” to the Monroe Doctrine can constrain our sovereignty.

Canada must strengthen continental defence while reducing dependencies that expose sovereign decisions to pressure. Cooperation remains essential. So does insurance against an unreliable partner. Neither reflexive accommodation nor theatrical defiance constitutes a strategy.

Britain’s 2025 strategy establishes a “NATO first” hierarchy. Canada needs comparable candour about the competing claims of Arctic defence, continental security, Europe and the Indo-Pacific.

Australia’s 2026 defence strategy supplies a practical test: sustaining military power “including when support from allies or partners may be limited.” Canada should ask what we must sustain when help is unavailable or uncertain. The answer should guide procurement, stockpiles and maintenance.

Norway’s 2025 strategy combines defence, economic security and societal resilience. Its warning is blunt: “We must be prepared for the fact that war could once again come to Norway.”

Canada’s circumstances differ, but a contested and warming Arctic leaves us exposed. Our own plan calls for preparation for “all contingencies up to and including war”.

Security depends on trusted institutions and functioning communities. In our North, housing, communications and transport are foundations of sovereignty.

What must Ottawa do?

First, rank the risks. Uncertainty makes threat assessment more necessary, not less. Otherwise, everything becomes strategic and nothing takes precedence. Stronger Canadian intelligence collection and assessment are essential to making those choices independently.

Second, attach responsibility, resources and deadlines to the promised policies. The implementation commitments include legislative proposals within a year and strategy updates every four years.

Annual reporting should distinguish announcements, contracts, deliveries and operational readiness. Ministers must be accountable for delivery across departmental boundaries.

Third, make federalism work. Provinces, Indigenous governments, municipalities and businesses control much of our essential infrastructure. Meetings must produce agreements, exercises and clear responsibilities.

Fourth, protect competition and liberty. Buying Canadian should purchase demonstrable security. Expanded intelligence powers require effective scrutiny.

Fifth, invest in people—and give Canadians a stake in service. Sweden, Finland and the Baltic states already operate conscription systems, as does Norway. Sweden also provides for civilian service in essential sectors. Their arrangements differ, but the common lesson is that preparedness reaches beyond professional armed forces.

Canada should provide civil defence and disaster preparedness training to its citizens as a component of national security. It should include a voluntary national-service year after high school, preferably in a different part of the country, offering paid placements in civil defence, community services or the military.

Finally, build broad parliamentary support for robust, ongoing national security. This plan must survive changes of prime ministers and governing parties. Opposition parties should help scrutinize priorities, costs and results. Durable agreement requires a meaningful role in shaping it.

Carney’s plan points Canada in the right direction. Sustaining it requires honesty about costs, difficult choices and patient execution.

The government has made its declaration. Now it must build the capacity — and the consent — to deliver.

Contributing Writer Colin Robertson, C.M., C.D, a former career diplomat, is a fellow and host of the Global Exchange podcast with the Canadian Global Affairs Institute in Ottawa.